INTRODUCTION
China's reform has achieved great success in the past 30 years. The Gross Domestic Product has been growing at roughly 10% every year. The economy has transformed from the former planned one to the current market economy. Although government intervention is still widespread, some industries in China have now been observing the most intensive competition in the world.
The miracle of China's success, in contrast with the relatively mediocre performance in the Eastern Europe, has attracted scholarly attention. In the early time, scholars observed forms rather than the essence. For instance, the reform in China was gradual rather than "big-bang"; agriculture reform preceded industrial reform, etc. Later, scholars investigated in more detail the institutional arrangements and proposed theories to explain China' success. For instance, the "local state corporatism" thesis 1 or "local governments as concept of private property rights. The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that misconceptions in private property rights could lead to misleading views on the understanding of the enterprise reform in China. Given that China's transition experience is arguably the most important one in the human history, a correct understanding of China's enterprise reform is vital to the understanding and development of institutional economics. It should be noted that I do not intend to review all the theories in relation to the economic transition in China. Rather the emphasis was placed on the mistakes which could possibly bewilder the future readers.
Hence, three interrelated areas were examined in detail. They are the merits of principal-agent theory in explaining China's enterprise reform, the concept of private property rights and the nature of township and village enterprises (TVEs).
The rest of the paper will be arranged as follows. The next section will survey papers on China's enterprise reform using principal-agent theory. It is found that researchers had divergent views on who were the principals of public enterprises. The applicability of PA theory in China's enterprise reform will then be questioned. The third section will show the widespread misconceptions of private property rights. This has led to divergent views on the nature of TVEs which will be discussed in the fourth section. The last section concludes.
APPLICABILITY OF PA THEORY IN CHINA'S ENTERPRISE REFORM
It has been popular to approach the issues of corporate governance in China's SOEs and TVEs with principal-agent (PA) theory. PA theory has been widely used to analyze corporate governance in advanced capitalist economies. PA relationship happens when a principal entrusts an agent to perform a certain tasks. Here, there must be a subject, the principal, who shall be able to make decisions. Whether a state or a department could be the principal is doubtful, as both are merely concepts instead of decision-making persons.
In addition, where the principal can entrust something to the agent, by definition the principal to some extent has property rights over that matter. However, it is well-known that the property rights were poorly defined at least in the early transition period of China's reform. Hence, there are a priori reasons to believe that PA theory is not suitable for analyzing China's enterprise reform, while there are indeed two major problems associated with the research works that make PA Theory not suitable for analyzing the issues of corporate governance of China's public enterprises. One problem is the enigmatic identity of the principals. The other lies in the merit of the theory in deriving refutable hypotheses.
Who are the principals?
In the studies of corporate governance in China's public enterprises, researchers differed in deciding who the principals were and who the agents were. Table 1 lists the PA relationships described by 17 works on China enterprises' corporate governance. Generally, researchers believed that the government or the state was the principal 24 . Indeed, Li and Wu 25 gave the generalized remark that "government agencies are principals" (p.2). This apparent contradiction is surprising, but it somehow reveals the difficulties in identifying the principals in the SOEs.
[ Table 1 here] Some researchers distinguished government from government officials. Perhaps they were aware of the fact that principals should be able to making decisions. For instance, Chen and Rozelle 26 and Shirley and Xu 27 thought that "government officials", instead of "government" itself, were the principals. While Lin and Zhu 28 did not distinguish "government" from "the people", claiming that "government (or the people)" was the first-tier principal, while "government bureaucrats" lied in the middle-tier who were both the agent to the first-tier principal and principal to the lower-tier agents. Likewise, Tylecote and Cai 29 and Zhou and Wang 30 thought that the "state" or "people" was the first-tier principal, but they distinguished the "state" from the "government", arguing that the "government" was the first order agent who in turn was the principal to lower order agents.
Hence, two-tiered or multi-tiered PA relationships were introduced. Even more complicated PA relationships have been introduced as well. For instance, Zhang 31 presented a "dual hierarchical PA chain" consisting of an upward PA relationship and a downward PA relationship. The former consisted of "residual claimants (co-owners)
of the public economy" as principals and "central committee representing the whole community" as the agent; while the latter consisted of the central committee as the principal and "insider members of the firm" as the agent. Hence, the PA relationship of the public economy was "typically characterized by two 'macro' hierarchies". The first hierarchy was formed via a delegation chain of power from the principals to the central committee. The second was formed via a delegation chain from the central committee to the insider members of the firms. Each player played two roles: he was the agent of the principal and the principal of the agent (p.234-235). The same author in one of his later paper 32 introduced two other systems of PA relationship. The author claimed that before the reform, there were two principals, namely, "ordinary citizens" as the "original principal", and the "central planners" as the "acting principals"; while "industrial bureau" served as both the agent to the acting principals and the principal to the lower tier agent which was the insider member of the firm. The author further described the situation after reform as one where there were two "legitimized principals", namely, the government and the insider members of the firm, and one "double-faced agent", namely, the industrial bureau. Unfortunately the introduction of such sophisticated systems of PA relationship did not help explain economic matters, as no refutable hypotheses could be deduced from these systems.
Instead of referring to either the government or the people, Cauley and Sandler 33 argued that although "an SOE represents a multilevel organization, for which principal-agent interactions exist between each pair of hierarchical levels", the focal PA relationship should be between the manager as the principal and the workers as the agents.
Researchers sometimes changed their minds in different pieces of works. Examples were Zhang 34 , which has been introduced above, and Shirley and Xu 35 . Shirley and Xu thought that "SOEs have no clear residual claimant" and "they are subject to many principals" (p.360). However, they thought that "government officials" are the principal in their later work 37 .
The wide divergence in identifying who are the principals in the corporate governance of China's enterprises raises the question of whether the principals exist at all. Chang 38 apparently noticed the problem of using the PA theory to explain corruption, pointing out that such a framework "presumed that the principal itself is not corrupt" (p.6). But why would the principal be corrupt? Applying the concepts of property rights, as encapsulated in Cheung's paper, "A Theory of Price Control" 39 , the reason is either: (a) the principal is not the private property rights owner, or (b) the relevant property rights are not clearly defined. Indeed, Zhou 40 argued that there was no principal in SOEs (p.139). Hua et al. 41 echoed this view and questioned that "who is really the 'state' and who represents it". They argued that "the principal is invisible" (p.407), since if all of China's citizens were considered as principals, it would be "too dispersed and powerless to exercise and control over SOEs" (p.408).
In contrast, the question who are the agents received less controversy. Most researchers believed that the managers of the SOEs are the agents 42 . Some others believed that employees of the enterprises are the agents 43 .
The wide divergence between the researchers' opinions on the identity of the principals of public enterprises is the most persuasive evidence that principal-agent theory is not suitable for analyzing the issues of corporate governance in China's public enterprises.
Further evidence lies in the fact that no refutable hypotheses have been derived from the theory. This will be examined in the next section.
The merit of PA theory in deriving refutable hypotheses
The merit of a theory lies in its capability of explaining or predicting human behaviours.
In this regard, the principal-agent theory has been very poor in explaining China's enterprise reform. Few refutable hypotheses have been decently deduced from the theory.
This could be revealed from a review of 15 works that studied SOEs using the principal-agent theory. Most of them, or 11 works 44 , neither provided any refutable hypothesis nor tested one. This is certainly not to say that these works themselves are of little merits. It is the merit of the PA theory they used that is being challenged. Since these works did not clearly provide hypotheses, it is often difficult to prove whether there were any problems with the theory.
Nonetheless, some problems in their assumptions or definitions were found. For instance, Cauley and Sandler 45 assumed that
Principal's wealth = agent's total effort + exogenous risk Where "principal's wealth may stand for profit or output", if "prices are normalized to equal one, then there is no difference between profit or output" (p.42). There are two mistakes here. Certainly effort is not the only factor affecting wealth or profit. If doing a business is equivalent to making efforts only, then one could seldom go bankrupt if he makes sufficient efforts. Secondly, output times prices makes revenue, not profit.
As a second example, Zhang 46 defined "degree of publicness" as the number of the original principals and "the size of the public economy" as the number of public-owned enterprises (p.231). These are clearly problematic. If we follow this principal, in case one shareholder sells all his shares to another shareholder, then the "publicness" of this company is reduced. Moreover, the author has assumed in the second definition that each and every enterprise is homogeneous. By adding unrealistic assumptions or using arbitrary definitions, one may be able to deduce some propositions. However, this is of little value in explaining real world phenomena. For the present purpose of examining the merits of a theory, suffice it to say that a theory is of little use in terms of explaining human behaviour if it could not deduce refutable hypotheses. As to the PA theory, the question remained is whether the empirical works produced refutable hypotheses from the theory.
There were 4 empirical studies 47 . However, none of them successfully proved the merit of PA theory in term of explaining human behaviours. prediction of a theory must be certain to make the theory useful. These works will be examined in more detail as follows. Li and Wu 51 examined the relative effectiveness of the ownership school of reform measures and the management school of reform measures. The only hypothesis that was derived from the perspective of the principal-agent theory was that "sharing profit with the manager will increase efficiency". The results were mixed, indicating that the PA theory may not be valid. Shirley and Xu 52 examined if and which of China's performance contracts improved productivity. There were two major problems that could easily invalidate the PA theory. One problem was that it was unclear how PA theory had led to the hypotheses. The other was that some of the findings actually refuted the PA theory. For instance, the authors asserted, without explanation, that bidding led to lower information asymmetry. Intuitively, bidding showed the commitment of the manager, which should mean that the shirking problem was less serious. However, the results showed that bidding did not increase productivity, thus refuting such a hypothesis. Secondly, performance bonding clearly showed a manager's commitment so that the shirking problem would be less serious. However, the results also showed that performance bonding did not increase productivity, thus refuting this hypothesis. The authors showed unwillingness to accept the results and attributed this to the weak enforcement of performance bonding, but produced no proof.
Mengistae and Xu 53 claimed that the PA theory was supported by merely showing that
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay was correlated with enterprise performance. The problem was that the existence of some correlation was not a refutable hypothesis, but a phenomenon. We do not know for sure what conditions changed to lead to such a phenomenon. Likewise, Xu 54 claimed that PA theory was supported by merely testing whether the advice suggested from the perspective of the PA theory was actually followed. There was no test for whether or not the principal-agent theory was applicable.
The PA theory originated from Williamson school of thought in terms of "shirking" or "opportunistic behaviour". The shirking problem is actually the metering problems of input productivity and rewards. People shirk because their productivities and / or rewards are difficult or costly to measure. The latter is one type of transaction cost. Theoretically the matter could be approached with either PA theory or transaction cost method. However, as it is difficult to measure shirking behaviour, it is hence difficult, if not impossible, to derive refutable hypotheses. Measurement of input productivities and rewards are difficult too. However, it is possible in some cases to measure them. The use of piece-rate contract is certainly one example where input productivities can be measured and priced. Since I have not identified any work that successfully derive refutable hypotheses in my review, I hence doubt the merit of using PA theory to explain China's enterprise reform. Of course this review of 15 studies which focused on China's enterprise reform was by no means exhaustive. It nonetheless reflects the limited merit of PA theory in terms of deriving refutable hypotheses. However, whether this theory is applicable to corporate governance in advanced capitalist economies is out of the scope of this paper.
One reason why there were disagreements on the identities of the principals is that many researchers did not have a correct concept of private property rights to which we turn.
MISCONCEPTIONS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS

Definition of private property rights
It has been generally agreed that private property rights are a bundle of rights. Cheung 55 defined private property rights as three sets of exclusive rights that consists of (a) the exclusive right to use or decide how to use; (b) the exclusive right to receive income generated from the use of; and (c) the right to alienate the property. The right to alienate the property includes "both the right to enter into contracts with other individuals and to choose the form of such contracts". These three sets of rights are referred to as "use right", "income right" and "alienation right" respectively in the following text, although the former two are sometimes known as "control right" and "residual claim right" in the literature on firm or team production. For instance, Alchian and Demsetz 56 argued that ownership of the classical firm is "the bundle of rights: 1) to be a residual claimant; 2) to observe input behaviour; 3) to be the central party common to all contracts with inputs; 4) to alter the membership of the team; and 5) to sell these rights" (p.783). If one generalizes No. 2) and 4) sets of rights to "control right" and No. 3) to alienation right, then this bundle of right was consistent with the definition of Cheung 57 .
The importance of clear delineation of private property rights towards market transaction has been clearly demonstrated by Ronald Coase in his investigation of the Federal Communications Commission
58 . The idea that "delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transaction" (p.27) was later known as one version of the Coase Theorem, while the importance of market transaction in improving economic welfare has been established since Adam Smith. Given the importance of delineation of private property rights, which one out of the three sets of rights is the most important in 55 75 . One implication of wrong definition of private property right lies in divergent views on the principals of the public economy which we have examined. The other implication lies in the analysis of the nature of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). These omission or misconceptions will be examined in more detail before we turn to the nature of TVEs.
Examples of wrong definition of private property rights
Grossman and Hart 76 defined ownership of the firm by "control right" (p.693-694) which is only the first set of private property rights. This definition was followed by some researchers, although normally they would have added the income right. For instance, Chang and Wang 77 expressly claimed that they followed Grossman and Hart's definition.
However, they extended the definition of ownership by including both "residual control right" and "residual benefit right" (p.435). Li et al. 78 defined ownership as "residual claimancy" (p.271). They claimed that "traditionally, ownership is defined by residual rights" and that "economists recognize that both residual claims and control rights are indispensable to ownership". However, they omitted control rights "not because they are irrelevant but for technical tractability" and they conjectured that "their results apply to control rights as well" (p.271). Similarly, control right (p.2) and decision right over the disposition of profit (p.6) were the only two aspects of private property rights. Perotti et al. 82 agreed that private property rights were "a bundle of rights" but among which the most important were "the allocations of residual control rights and rights to residual benefits" (p.163). W. Li 83 did not make express definition. However, He implied that private property rights are "rights of control" and "residual claim". Zhou and Wang 84 agreed that "the modern theory of property rights views ownership as a system of control rights and cash flow rights" (p.312).
In contrast to the omission of alienation right, Furubotn and Pejovich 85 opined that the right of ownership in an asset consisted of "the right to use it, to change its form and substance, and to transfer all rights in the asset through, e.g. sale, or some rights through, e.g. rental" (p.1140). This concept included both use right and alienation right, with income right missing.
Ownership per se is not important to the private property rights. The Hong Kong land tenure system is a good example. All lands in Hong Kong belonged to the Crown before 1997 and to the Hong Kong government after 1997. However, the individual land "owners" still enjoy the use right, income right and alienation right, hence possessing the private property rights. If ownership per se is important, then this international famous example of capitalistic economy will have become "socialistic". In our survey, there was one work that seemed to have thought ownership as one decisive factor for private property rights 86 . The authors thought there were four basic tenets of property rights: ownership, residual claimant, alienation right, residual right of control.
Examples of correct definition of private property rights
Fortunately, there have been a few works which revealed a correct understanding of the private property rights. For instance, Putterman 87 indicated that the "core bundle of rights that comprise 'ownership' are the right to utilize the asset (utilization right), the right to possess the fruits (and responsibility for the negative outcomes, such as damages and debts), and the right to transfer these rights to another agent through gift or sale (alienation right)" (p.1049). Although Li et al. 88 cited the definition of ownership from Furubotn and Pejovich 89 , they nevertheless added income right to the bundle, arguing that the three elements of ownership were "the right to sell an asset", "the right to the returns generated from an asset", and "the right to change the form or substance of an asset" (p.1146).
Other examples of correct definition of private property rights 90 will be reviewed in the analysis of the nature of TVE below. Researchers have had divergent views on the nature of the TVE. The key to understanding its nature is whether or not researchers had a correct concept of private property rights.
THE NATURE OF TVE
The nature of township and village enterprise (TVE) was one of the most controversial topics in the literature of economic transition in China. Numerous researches have intended to identify its nature. Examples were Chang and Wang 91 , Che and Qian 92 , Gordon and Li 93 ,
Still some thought that TVEs were owned by local governments 109 . Others insisted that TVEs had ambiguous or vaguely defined property rights 110 .
There are 9 works that studied the nature of TVEs but did not provide a definition of property rights. Three works thought that TVEs are owned by community members and controlled by the TVGs 111 . Another 3 works thought TVGs owned the TVEs 112 . One work simply summarized theories of TVEs but did not provide its own understanding 113 .
Another work thought that TVEs could be characterized as hybrid forms 114 . The remaining one work 115 was notable in that it emphasized that the property right structure of TVEs should not be regarded as static. Rather, TVEs have evolved from de facto TVG ownership in the past to the present diversified forms. The most notable form was joint stock cooperatives.
The nature of TVE with correct definition of private property rights
Researchers who had a correct understanding of private property rights would find that the ownership of TVEs was held by the TVGs. There are three such works in our survey. Naughton 116 opined that township and village officials in their official capacity owned the TVEs because they possessed all the "key components of property rights: control of residual income, the right to dispose of assets, and the right to appoint and dismiss managers and assume direct control in necessary" (p.267). Similarly, Walder 117 opined that the Township and Village Government (TVG) held the property rights of TVEs as they held "all rights to control, income flows, and sale or liquidation" (p.270). A further example is Smyth 118 who also agreed that TVG exercised the property rights in the TVE as it possessed "the privileges of ownership, i.e., the right to transfer, use, or appropriate the assets" (p.788).
The nature of TVE interpreted
concepts perfectly understandable if one has a correct concept of private property rights. This paper has proposed that principal-agent theory is not suitable for analyzing state-owned enterprises as by definition the principals must be able to make decisions and own the property rights. It further demonstrated that the application of the theory had been problematic because of the enigmatic identify of the principals and the inability of deducing refutable hypotheses. Whether this theory is applicable to advanced capitalist economies is beyond the scope of this paper. One primary reason for the divergent views on the identity of principal was the widespread misconceptions on the private property rights. This misconception further led to divergent views on the nature of another important actor in China's economy, the township and village enterprises. Since state-owned enterprises and township and village enterprises were the only two significant forms of enterprises in the early stage of China's reform, the coverage of this paper is hence comprehensive. It is hoped that clarification of these three concepts would facilitate further and better understanding of the transition economy in China. 
